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Abstract. Active wardens have been an area of postulation in the community
for nearly two decades, but to date there have been no published implementations
that can be used to stop steganography as it transits networks. In this paper we ex-
amine the techniques and challenges of a high-bandwidth, unattended, real-time,
active warden in the context of a network ﬁrewall.In particular, we concentrate on
structured carriers with objectively deﬁned semantics, such as the TCP/IP proto-
col suite rather than on the subjective, or unstructured carriers such as images that
dominate the information hiding literature. We introduce the concept of Minimal
Requisite Fidelity (MRF) as a measure of the degree of signal ﬁdelity that is both
acceptable to end users and destructive to covert communications. For unstruc-
tured carriers, which lack objective semantics, wardens can use techniques such
as adding noise to block subliminal information. However, these techniques can
break the overt communications of structured carriers which have strict seman-
tics. We therefore use a speciﬁcation-based approach to determine MRF. We use
MRF to reason about opportunities for embedding covert or subliminal informa-
tion in network protocols and develop both software to exploit these channels, as
well as an active warden implementation that stops them. For unstructured carri-
ers, MRF is limited by human perception, but for structured carriers, well known
semantics give us high assurance that a warden can completely eliminate certain
subliminal or covert channels.
1 Introduction
Network security is one of the most pressing and difﬁcult problems facing modern pri-
vate organizationsand governments.In addition to the daily barrageof unwanted trafﬁc
from network scans, viruses, worms, exploit tools, and other unauthorized attempts to
gain access, sites must be concerned with malicious insiders using digital carriers to
secretly disperse information through the very perimeter that is supposed to be protect-
ing the network. The ubiquitous use of protocols and ﬁle structures laden with loose
semantics and unused or marginally-signiﬁcant bits that can be freely used for covert
communication channels only furthers those challenges.
This paper focuses on the pragmatic challenges of implementing an active warden
as a part of a network ﬁrewall. In particular, we concentrate on structured carriers such
as the TCP/IP protocolsuite rather than on the subjective,or unstructured carriers, such
as images, that dominate the information hiding literature. We call a carrier structured
if there is a well-deﬁned, objective semantics deﬁning the overt information content of
the carrier.Althoughwardenshave beenan area ofresearch in the communitysince Simmons’s
1983 paper [31], after nearly two decades, active wardens still remain largely theoreti-
cal. The ﬁrst contribution of this paper is the creation of an active warden system that
operates on network trafﬁc like a ﬁrewall. The context of a high-bandwidth, real-time,
unattended ﬁrewall constrains the approaches available to warden design. For instance,
passive detection systems such as intrusion detection systems are often viewed as a
second-tier defense, with preventative ﬁrewall systems being the preferred primary de-
fense. Further, the practical capabilities of an active warden differ signiﬁcantly from
those of a theoretical warden. The implementation of active wardens will improve un-
derstanding of what wardens can do, as well as enabling validation of watermark and
steganographic algorithm robustness.
Internet trafﬁc also affects the relative importance of various carriers for covert or
subliminal information. While the information hiding community is attentive to the de-
tectability and robustness of information embedded in carriers such as images, audio,
and natural language, there has been less effort placed on understanding the ability to
use network protocols as carriers. A network warden must address all of the indispens-
able media types, and clearly protocols themselves cannot be avoided.
Thus,oursecondcontributionis theidentiﬁcationandexplorationofaclass ofcarri-
ers that differsigniﬁcantly fromcommon,unstructuredcarriers exempliﬁedby images,
audio,andnaturallanguage.Networkprotocolsandcomputerlanguages(suchas XML,
machinecode,etc.) are examplesof structuredcarriers that are interpretedbymachines
rather than humans. In contrast, unstructured carriers are subjectively interpreted by a
human. While pseudo-random noise has often been suggested as a way to remove sub-
liminalinformationfroma carrier,randomnoisecanalso obliteratetheovertfunctionof
structured carriers. It is for these same reasons that lossy compression is primarily used
only on unstructured carriers. As shown later, a more delicate and directed approach is
therefore required.
OurthirdcontributionistheconceptofMinimalRequisiteFidelity(MRF),whichwe
deﬁne as the degreeof signal ﬁdelity that is both acceptable to end users and destructive
to covert communications. MRF determines the limit of distortion we can introduce
to a carrier channel in an attempt to foil any covert or subliminal channels. For the
defender, MRF deﬁnes an upper-bound in the amount of modiﬁcations to the channel.
This gives an advantage to the defender, because potentially this can greatly decrease
or eliminate the capacity of the covert channel. For unstructured carriers that lack well-
deﬁned syntax or semantics, MRF is deﬁned by human perception, but for structured
carriers, well-deﬁned semantics give us high assurance that a warden can completely
eliminate certain subliminal or covert channels. Further, the MRF paradigm, as applied
to networkpackets,includesanemergingarea ofresearchintoexploitingandcorrecting
ambiguities that create opportunities for intrusion detection evasion [24,29].
Our fourth contribution is a speciﬁcation-based analysis of TCP and IP in order to
identify ambiguities that allow network trafﬁc to be used as a carrier for steganographic
content. We demonstrate these ambiguities with a software tool that sends covert in-
formation in several of these ﬁelds. In addition, we implement a network warden that
removes these ambiguities without breaking overt communications. We show that TCP
and IP are fertile ground for covert and subliminal information, but we also validatethat manyof these opportunitiescan beeliminatedthroughtheuse of a fully-automated,
real-time,networkwarden.Further,themodiﬁcationsthata wardenmustmakeonpack-
ets are generally no more intrusive than those made by existing packet scrubbers [21,
10], ﬁrewalls, and NAT boxes.
This paper is organized as follows: In x2, we discuss the threat model and potential
consequences. In x3, we summarize the research to date and related work in the rele-
vant areas of steganography and network intrusions. In x4, we explore the concept of
Minimal Requisite Fidelity and in x5 we introduce examples of and embedding tech-
niques for unstructured carriers and structured carriers. In x6, we develop algorithmic
techniques for enforcing Minimal Requisite Fidelity in IP and TCP, and also examine
applicability to other network security problems. We discuss our implementation and
challengesthatwediscoveredduringitscreationinx7,andlastly,we concludethepaper
in x8.
2 Threat Model
Historically, the malicious insider has been one of the greatest threats to organizations
[2], but techniques to stop these insiders are often time-consuming and inadequate. In
the example of the admitted FBI spy Robert Hanssen, his espionage activities were not
detected and stopped for over a decade [11,27]. Meanwhile, he distributed some of
the US government’s most classiﬁed information directly into the hands of the KGB.
According to his own afﬁdavit, Hanssen’s success was facilitated by various forms of
steganography and other undercover techniques to communicate and transfer informa-
tion.
Secureorganizationsgoto greatlengthsto securetheirmachinesandnetworksfrom
outside attackers. However, the vast number of insiders are largely trusted in order to
maintain productivity. As a result, most insiders are able to gain complete control of
several internal computer systems. Inevitably, there is some communication between
these systems and external systems that may cooperate in the transfer of covert data.
Since the insiders have access to both restricted data and machines which they can use
to covertly distribute that data, the problem of detecting and stopping this unwanted
behavior is extremely challenging.
Even where personnel security is not of great concern, malicious software agents
provide equivalent threats. There are many paths for viruses, worms, etc. to enter a
network. Once active, these agents have all the electronic capabilities of a malicious
individual. Further, network communications may be the only communications path
these agents have.
Our model is designed for high-security environments where the network is not
a free channel, but is instead frequently monitored or restricted against unauthorized
usage. Wardens are not a form of censorship themselves, but merely enforce that all
communications are overt. We recognize that our framework may not be appropriate
for the Internetas a whole, but only for restricted environmentswhere there is a deﬁnite
threat that a malicious insider could do permanent damage.
In addition to using covert channels in Internet trafﬁc, there are a plethora of other
ways that a malicious insider could extract data from a given site, such as copyingProtocol Covert Channel Bandwidth Rule State?
IP Hide data in padding bits 31 bits/packet Zero these bits No
IP Use IP id as covert channel 16 bits/packet Reassemble and randomize
IP id
Yes
IP Set false source address to
bounce messages
32 bits/packet Egress ﬁltering No
IP Use of IP timestamp option 1 bit/packet Require or prohibit usage No
IP Use destination address as
ﬂag
8 bits/packet Anomaly Detection Yes
IP Use unnecessary ﬁelds
(ToS, options, DF if a
fragment, etc)
varies Zero these ﬁelds No
TCP Hide data in padding bits 31 bits/packet Zero all padding bits No
TCP Use initial sequence number
as covert channel
32 bits/connection Apply offset to sequence
numbers
No
TCP Use urgent pointer ﬁeld
when URG bit not set
16 bits/packet Zero urgent pointer when
URG bit is not set
No
TCP Use reserved bits 6 bits/packet Zero reserved bits No
TCP Use data ﬁeld when RST=1 varies Zero data if RST=1 No
TCP Use source and destination
ports as data
32 bits/packet Anomaly Detection Yes
UDP Use checksum use as a ﬂag 1 bit/packet Anomaly Detection Yes
ICMP Use code ﬁeld when just
sending a type
8 bits/packet Zero code ﬁeld if just send-
ing a type
No
ICMP Use unused bits as a covert
channel
32 bits/packet Zero unused bits No
Fig.1. Partial rule sets for IP, TCP, UDP, and ICMP
the data onto a ﬂoppy disk and carrying it home. However, our research is limited to
network security and not physical security, and as such, we do not address this threat.
2.1 Potential Damage
Each steganographic algorithm has a data to carrier ratio that deﬁnes the bandwidth of
the carrier. For images, this can be very high (over 50%). Using speciﬁc embedding
algorithms such as BPCS [19], a 1 MB image could contain up to 500K of hidden data.
Perhaps the highest-bandwidth carrier is network trafﬁc itself. Each packet has the
potential to carry over 8 bytes of data (See Figure 1). We analyzed trafﬁc at one large
site where over 500 million packets left the site each day. Assuming a malicious insider
could control timing of packets to get 1 bit of data out per packet, the site could lose
over26 GB annually.If a malicious insider could manipulate8 bytes in each packet,the
site could loose over 4 GB daily. When combined with the potential that each e-mail
attachment can have embedded data, the potential loss rates are staggering.Completely eliminating the leakage of information is very difﬁcult. However, we
are primarily concerned with relatively high-bandwidth leakage of information. While
it is feasible that a malicious insider could transit a very small amount of information
per day that would not be stopped by our warden, we feel that this is a problem that is
best addressed once the high-bandwidth leakage is curbed.
2.2 Deﬁciencies of Detection Techniques
We argue that security mechanisms must adopt proactive as well as reactive defenses.
As evidenced by the need for both ﬁrewalls and intrusion detection, prevention is an
equally, if not more important problem than detection. While there are several tech-
niques currently in use that reactively attempt to detect steganographyin images, this is
understandably an impossible task to complete, as there are many places to hide data,
and many ways to hide the data in those places. In this section we discuss some of these
detection techniques and their limitations.
Johnson has done extensive work in identifying signatures for speciﬁc stegano-
graphic techniques [12,15]. By closely monitoring the artifacts left from several com-
mercial products, he noticed several distinguishing traits for many commercial prod-
ucts. Since all of the commercial techniques modify the carrier in some way, he was
able to document many of these signatures. However, his published observations were
limited to commercial steganographic packages, and the majority of malicious insiders
would not opt to use such public techniques in their covert transfers.
In [8], Fridrich et al. discuss a simple technique to detect hidden information in the
least-signiﬁcant bits of images by observing the number close colors in images. While
their technique works relatively well to detect large hidden messages, small embedded
messages produce an error rate of up to 40%.
In [28], Provos attempted to ﬁnd images containing steganography on the Internet.
He downloaded 3 million JPEG images from Ebay and Usenet, and performed several
tests to attempt to determine if they had embeddeddata from JP-Hide [16], J-Steg [17],
or Outguess [23]. Provos’ detection tool Stegdetect [33] identiﬁed over 54,000 images
with these detection signatures, but was unable to ﬁnd the passwords for any of these
images. As such, his results were inconclusive.
While it is useful to gain intelligence about the activities of attackers, our primary
goal is to providesystem and informationsecurity rather than to collect attack informa-
tion or spend time ﬁnding and deﬁning steganographic signatures. This does not mean
that we have abandoned the task of discovering the perpetrators. However, this poten-
tially time-consuming task may be best done off-line after the necessary modiﬁcations
have been made to prevent the covert channels, but before the original connection state
is purged from our warden.
3 Related Work
The terms covert channel and subliminal channel are often used interchangeably, but
in this paper we use the following deﬁnitions from the literature. Lampson deﬁnes a
covert channel as a channel that is not intended for information transfer [20,9]. In[31], Simmons describes a subliminal channel as one where hidden data piggybacks
on an innocuous-lookinglegitimate communication. By deﬁnition, steganographic car-
riers aresubliminalchannelssince thecommunicationappearsto beinnocent,but really
has ulterior information embedded below the threshold of perception.
Active wardens have been an area of postulation since Simmons [31] introduced
the Prisoners’ Problem in 1983. Simmons presents Alice and Bob as prisoners that
collectively wish to plan their escape. However, since they are in separate areas of the
prison, all of their communication must pass through the warden, Willy. If Willy sees
any attempts at secret communication in their messages, he will stymie their efforts by
not allowing them to communicate in the future. Thus, Alice and Bob must use a sub-
liminal channel to communicate their escape plan without alerting Willy. Since Willy
knows that Alice and Bob may wish to communicate secretly, he must carefully ana-
lyze all correspondencebetween Alice and Bob, but he must do so without perceptively
altering their message or incurring a noticeable time delay. In this context, Simmons
deﬁned a subliminal channel as a communications channel whose very existence is un-
detectable to a warden.
Active wardens have been discussed on several occasions [3,1,31,4,15] to actively
block the creation of subliminal channels, but to date, there have been no published
implementations of this type of warden. Meanwhile, ﬁrewalls are a routinely used form
of active warden that is targeted at blocking unauthorized network access.
In [3], Anderson discusses both passive wardens, which monitor trafﬁc and report
when some unauthorized trafﬁc is detected, and active wardens, who try to remove any
information that could possibly be embedded in trafﬁc that passes by. In [3], Anderson
shows that there are methods ‘more contrived than practical’ where embedded data
could survive a pass through an active warden.
In [6], Ettinger develops the idea of critical distortion in an active warden scenario
between two game players, a data hider and a data attacker. Equilibria for the game is
achieved when the communicationchannel is distorted to a level where covert channels
will not survive. Ettinger observed that due to the large number of bits that both the
data hider and the data attacker could modify, this problem was extremely complex.
While we don’t dispute this fact, our approach fundamentally differs from his in that
Ettinger attempted to determine the critical distortion dynamically, without any prior
knowledge of the steganographic carrier. Our technique implements static rule sets for
a given carrier that are applied to the data as it traverses the network. By restricting
the problem in this fashion, we are able to successfully eliminate steganography from
certain carriers in Internet trafﬁc.
In 1997, Petitcolas published Stirmark [26,25,34], which has some of the func-
tionality of a warden, but does not automatically change all network information as it
traverses a network. Instead, Stirmark is an application program that will attempt to
remove steganography in a given image. If modiﬁed, Stirmark could be used as a net-
worked warden for certain types of unstructured carriers. In contrast, our contributions
in this paper focus primarily on structured carriers such as TCP/IP.
Also in the area of unstructured carriers, Johnson [12] tested several contemporary
steganographic systems for robustness. His tests involved embedding information into
an image, and then testing its survivability against a myriad of techniques includingformat translation, bit-density translation, blurring, smoothing, adding and removing
noise, edge-sharpening, rotation, and dilation. Johnson noted that tools that rely of bit-
wise embedding methods failed all of the tests.
Digital watermarking [25,13] uses many of the same techniques as steganography,
but sometimes with an emphasis on robustness more than secrecy. Watermarks are de-
signed to be tolerant of attempts to remove them by altering or transformingthe carrier.
An active warden would have a more difﬁcult time removinga good watermark, but the
detection of that watermark may also be proportionatelyeasier.
A network intrusion detection system is a form of passive warden that observes net-
work trafﬁc in search of malicious attacks. However, there have been several studies of
ways to subvert intrusion detection systems using techniques known as packet evasion
[29,24] which exploit ambiguities in the semantics of network protocols and differ-
ences in perspectivebetween intrusiondetection systems and end hosts. Recently, it has
beenshownthatthiskindofattackcanbedefendedagainstthroughtheuseofaprotocol
scrubber[21]ora trafﬁcnormalizer[10]whichreducesambiguoustrafﬁcto a canonical
form that can be more reliably monitored. Similar techniques have been used to limit
the amount of information leaked to a system ﬁngerprinting mechanism such as nmap
[32]. While some of the mechanisms used to perform scrubbing and normalization are
similar to that of an active warden, the problem domains differ.
4 Minimal Requisite Fidelity
Wardenshavefrequentlybeendiscussedas actorsina securitysystem,butinourmodel,
an active warden is a network service that is architecturally similar to a ﬁrewall, but
functionallyquitedifferent.Likeaﬁrewall,awardenimplementsasite’s securitypolicy.
To prevent attacks from the outside, inside, or both, the warden modiﬁes all trafﬁc to
remove many, if not all, of the carriers that can be used for covert channels, subliminal
channels, intrusion detection evasion, and even some forms of attacks. Because this
warden is a network service, it must be concerned not only with the application data
that it handles, but also with the network protocols used to exchange data.
One way to prevent the use of covert channels and subliminal channels across a
network is to drastically alter all data that passes across that network and that may be
used as a carrier. For example, if it is believed that data is embedded in color detail,
all images can be convertedto monochrome.However,this level of modiﬁcation would
disrupt users and is not generally acceptable.
An alternate technique for preventing the successful use of covert channels is to
distort potential carriers just enough that any covert and subliminal channels in those
carriers become unusable. If done carefully, the overt users of the carriers remain un-
aware of these modiﬁcations. We describe this modiﬁcation of trafﬁc as imposing Min-
imal Requisite Fidelity. This term captures the essence of both the opportunity for data
embedding and a warden’s defense. The basic premise is that for any communication
there is some ﬁdelity at which the data is interpreted by the recipient. For example, an
image displayed in a web browser is intended for human consumption and need not
possess any more information than is apparent to a human eye viewing a computer
screen. However, the transmitted data may contain more detailed information than isperceptible to the viewer. As described in the following section, minute differences in
color, textures, saturation, or other measures can be used to hide a wealth of informa-
tion. The paradigm of Minimal Requisite Fidelity refers to determiningthe threshold of
ﬁdelity that is required for overt communications with the recipient and then limiting
the ﬁdelity of network transmissions so that no additional information is preserved.
Since MRF preserves functionality while altering the exact values seen by the re-
ceiver, it makes the job of an attacker much more difﬁcult, if not impossible. In this
regard, an active warden enforcing MRF is very much like a network proxy. Such a
warden acts as a semantic proxy by relaying the semantics of the protocol while insu-
lating each end-point from the speciﬁc syntax created by that end-point. To date, there
has been no theory behind proxies, but MRF could be used to deﬁne one.
The ability to perform this ﬁdelity modiﬁcation varies with the type of carrier be-
ing used. In the next section, we break carriers into two broad classes of structured
and unstructured carriers and provide examples of how the Minimal Requisite Fidelity
paradigm can be applied to them. We will show that the paradigm is equally applicable,
but that additional constraints present with structured carriers allow for much stronger
guarantees to be made.
5 Carrier Taxonomy
In this section, we will examine techniques for embedding data in some common ex-
amples of unstructured carriers and structured carriers. The deﬁnition of MRF for the
two different types of carriers is quite different.
5.1 Unstructured Carriers
A subliminal channel is based on modifying a carrier in imperceptible ways. For what
we call unstructured carriers, the limits to what can be changed are deﬁned by fuzzy
notionssuchas perception.Perceptioncan bequantiﬁedandcarriers canbe subjectedto
statistical analysis, but there is no universal, objective bound to how much information
can be altered for purposes of embedding. Below this level of perception, arbitrary
changes can be made to the data in order to embed information. However, an active
wardencan make use of the exactsame freedomsto destroyanyembeddedinformation.
Examples of techniques to embed data in unstructured carriers are Null Ciphers -
hiding data in plain text [18]; Least-Signiﬁcant Bit Embedding - modifying the least-
signiﬁcant bit of speciﬁed pixels that result in color variations that are not distinguish-
able to the human eye [14]; Bit-Plane Embedding - identifying noisy regions of each
bit-plane in an image and replacing those regions with embedded data [19]; and Dis-
crete Cosine Transformation - modifying and converting pixel values into frequency
values using the IDCT [13].
Quantifying MRF for Unstructured Carriers: In each of these examples of un-
structuredcarriers, a Minimal Requisite Fidelity can be deﬁned.This would be the min-
imum amount of purity in an unstructured carrier that is needed to convey the meaning
of the carrier. In the example of an image, this MRF would be the set of minimal colors
that displays the image as seen by the human eye. In a null cipher, the MRF could beachieved by slightly rewording phrases and adding spaces and tabs to the end of lines
so the same meaning is conveyed, but in a slightly different format.
However, ﬁnding the correct Minimal Requisite Fidelity for unstructured carriers is
challenging. Because there are not objective bounds to the carrier, a threshold of requi-
site ﬁdelity must be chosen subjectively. This threshold can be based upon knowledge
of human perception, or the typical use of data. However, there remains the possibility
that a determinedadversarywill risk makingperceptible changes for the sake of getting
a signal through. For instance, a warden may thwart BPCS by modifying all noisy re-
gionsinanimage,butthethresholdfordeﬁninganoisyregionisarbitrary.Anadversary
could embed data in less noisy regions at the expense of making them appear grainy.
While a warden might not be able to make all images grainy, grainy images might le-
gitimately occur and be let through. Nonetheless, a warden may be able to assume that
preserving graininess is not a requirement. In this case, smoothing or randomizing of
grain could be employed.
Clearly,thereis a cycleof measureand counter-measureto this game.However,any
time a warden can afford to reduce the ﬁdelity of the carrier, the adversary’s job gets
harder. While this cycle may be arduous, it at least makes forward progress towards
security.
5.2 Structured Carriers
In contrast to unstructured carriers such as plain text, structured carriers are instantia-
tions of some well-deﬁned syntax and semantics. In this section we focus on a signiﬁ-
cantexampleofthe structuredcarrier,networkprotocols.We ﬁrst presentan exampleof
network trafﬁc embeddingand then examinehow this techniqueexploits the syntax and
semantics of the protocol. This examination leads to a formal expression of Minimal
Requisite Fidelity. The ability to make such formal expressions is a unique characteris-
tic of structured protocols and enables wardens to more thoroughly apply the concept
of Minimal Requisite Fidelity.
Network protocols such as the TCP/IP family of Internet protocols deﬁne both a
syntax for network packets as well as the semantics used by systems exchanging pack-
ets. The syntax is the data format for packets that traverse the network. This syntax is
not unlike the image encodingformat of some unstructuredcarriers. What makes struc-
tured carriers different is the additional speciﬁcation of semantics that describe how a
packet is interpreted and what actions the end host will make based upon that packet.
For example,the Covert TCP [30] programmanipulatesTCP/IP headerinformation
to encode ASCII values in header ﬁelds. Covert TCP makes use of the fact that IP uses
arbitrarily assigned numbers to identify packets. Each packet has an ID ﬁeld containing
a 16-bit number. This ID has no notion of order and is used purely to let a packet be
fragmentedwhile allowingthe receiverto identifyrelated fragmentsand reassemblethe
larger packet. Every associated fragment will contain the same ID, while fragments of
different packets will contain different IDs. Covert TCP chooses IDs that contain data
to be sent. As a simpliﬁed example, the string ‘STEG’ can be embedded in a series of
four packets where the ﬁrst packet has an ID equal to the ASCII value of ‘S’, the second
has an ID equal to ‘T’ and so on.Because the semantics of the ID ﬁeld are so clearly deﬁned, Covert TCP is able
to fully exploit the protocol without the risk that its choice of ID numbers will cause
changes that are perceptible to the recipients of the packet. However, an active warden
canusethesamefacttorenumberIDstothwartsuchchannels.Inthefollowingsections,
we provide a concrete analysis of the semantics of this example and how MRF can be
absolutely applied to this type of carrier.
Quantifying MRF for Structured Carriers: Information theory provides a basis
for analyzing the ﬁdelity required to support the semantics of structured carriers. While
the identiﬁer ﬁeld is not required to be a random variable, the difference between the
amount of information contained in the ﬁeld, 1 of 216 values, and the amount of infor-
mation provided to the receiver is startling. The receiver need only match a fragment to
1=n packets where n is the number of packets that the receiver may be reassembling at
any point in time. For TCP, which accounts for the vast majority of trafﬁc,1 the value
of n is bounded by the receiver’s advertised window size and is typically zero since
most upper-layer protocols tend to avoid fragmentation for performance reasons. Thus,
in the typical case, the amount of entropy present in the identiﬁer is much greater than
the amount required by the protocol semantics.
This extra entropy can be used by programs such as Covert TCP or more sophis-
ticated steganography in order to create a covert or subliminal channel. However, our
deﬁnition of the amount of entropy required by the protocol semantics also leads us
to search for a bijective transformation that randomizes this extra information while
preserving semantics. With such a transformation, a warden can randomly permute the
identiﬁers chosen by untrusted end systems.
Assuming that a warden used some permutation function, f(x), an attacker could
potentially learn the values of the renumbered packets and attempt to engineer an in-
verse functionso that she may transmit packets with an invertedID, f  1(x), that, when
transformedbythe warden,becomesthe intendedvalue,f(f  1(x)) = x. However,this
kind of security feature is the very problem that encryption systems address. Therefore,
we can employ an encryption algorithm to perform this permutation. Thus, we can re-
cast the problem of randomizing excess entropy as a solved problem of encrypting the
packet ﬁeld.
Covert TCP provides us with an example second problem with slightly different
semantics. This example will exercise our reasoning and shows that our method for
enforcing Minimal Requisite Fidelity has promise for additional carriers. Covert TCP
can also embed data in the TCP initial sequence number, which is another arbitrarily
chosen number. However, the semantics of this number are somewhat different in that
subsequent packets from the initial sender will contain a sequence number computed
by incrementingthe initial sequencenumber.Further,the receiverwill acknowledgethe
receipt of these sequence numbers back to the sender. Thus, the permutation must be
applied only to the initial sequence number of a connection. If the warden saves the
difference between the original and modiﬁed initial sequence number, it can re-apply
this offset to all subsequent packets in that connection.
1 In our traces TCP accounts for 93% of the trafﬁc. Figures vary, but this is not an unusual
amount.6 MRF Analysis of IP
Having seen that Minimal Requisite Fidelity can be precisely identiﬁed and manipu-
lated in structured carriers, we now perform a more complete examination of the pro-
tocol headers and semantics in IP. We choose to look at IP because it has well-deﬁned
semantics andbecause without addressingIP, no Internettrafﬁc can be consideredcom-
pletely protected. This case study will validate the applicability of the MRF model and
demonstrate how a warden can provide some assurances about entire protocol layers.
This analysis differs from previous work in [10] and [21] in that we are stopping the
covert ﬂow of data rather than attacks by a malicious outsider.
The MRF analysis of all IP ﬁelds is presented below as a taxonomy of ﬁeld seman-
tics. For the sake of brevity, we do not discuss the individual IP option ﬁelds which
are rarely used and in general are quite open to modiﬁcation by both adversaries and
wardens.
Constant: (Version, Padding) These ﬁelds are effectively constants than cannot be
changed without fundamentally changing the functions of the protocol. The version
ﬁeld speciﬁes which version of the protocol is being used. Any value other than 4 (IP
version 4) will cause the remainder of the packet to be interpreted with a completely
different set of syntax and semantics. For instance, version 6 is the latest version, and
while not widely supported, has similar, but slightly different deﬁnitions for syntax
and semantics. An IPv4 packet cannot be turned into a valid IPv6 packet by simply
changing the version number. For the sake of brevity, we assume IPv4 and term this
ﬁeld a constant. However, a more holistic analysis would examine all other versions of
IP.
Free: (Type of Service, Don’t Fragment Flag, Reserved Bits) These ﬁelds can hold
arbitrary values while preserving the basic functionality of the protocol. Thus, wardens
should modify these variables religiously. Due to nuances of these ﬁelds, we suggest
that a warden not randomizethem, but instead set them to safe defaults for the warden’s
network environment.
Notethat this categorizationofthe typeofservice ﬁeld maychangeif Differentiated
Services [22] becomes widely deployed. However the Diff-Serv architecture assumes
that this ﬁeld will be administered according to local network policy and the warden
may be a party to that policy.
Decreasing: (Time To Live) The time to live is a counter value that is decremented
at each hop. When the time to live reaches zero, the packet is discarded. This causes
packets in routing loops to eventually be dropped. The TTL can be changed, but in
order to preserve the routing loop behavior, the new TTL should always be lower than
the existing TTL. Note that decreasing the TTL will prevent traceroute from working
properly since it depends on TTL values being decremented only once per hop.
Tokens: (Identiﬁcation, Source Address) These ﬁelds, as described earlier, serve to
correlate packets. The values themselves are arbitrarily chosen and can be mapped to
different values, but this mapping must be stable across packets. Source address has
some additional constraints in that it will be used to form reply and error messages.
Thus, it must refer to the originator’s address or the address of system willing to proxy
these messages to the originator. Network Address Translation is a widely-deployed
technology that rewrites source addresses on trafﬁc passing through a gateway [5].Derivative: (Header Length, Header Checksum) These ﬁelds are determined by
other aspects of the header. The length is determined by the number of options in-
cluded in the header, while the header checksum is computed from all other ﬁelds in
the IP header (excluding payload). If the checksum alone is changed, the packet will be
dropped in transit.
Fragmentation: (More Fragments Flag, Fragment Offset, Total Length) The max-
imum amount of data that can be sent is bounded by what the upper-layer protocol
provides, but the IP layer has ﬂexibility in how a payload is fragmented and sent. Frag-
ments can be reassembled into a larger packet and then re-fragmented along different
boundaries.
Dependent: (Destination Address, Protocol, Payload) These ﬁelds are determined
by upper-layer protocols. In general, every value is legal, but the legality of any spe-
ciﬁc value is determined by the upper-layer using the protocol. As a result, neither an
adversary nor a warden can directly alter these values without altering the behavior of
the protocol. However, a warden operating at a higher layer should cause these ﬁelds to
be changed wherever possible. For instance, an adversary or a warden could segment
the upper-layer packets differently in order to embed or remove information in packet
sizes.
The destination address cannot be changed by a warden. However, it does exhibit
a property common to other ﬁelds in the dependent category. If an adversary is creat-
ing packets that do not contain legitimate data streams, arbitrary values can be chosen
for these ﬁelds. For instance, a malicious party could generate trafﬁc to incorrect or
ﬁctitious destinations knowing that the route to that address will cause the packets to
traverse a link where a collaborating receiver can eavesdrop on trafﬁc and observe the
message. Additionally, an adversary could target speciﬁc machines on a subnet to sent
covert messages.
AlthoughtheIP headeris compactlydesigned,it is worthnotingthatotherprotocols
haveadditionalﬁeldsthatarepredicated.Theseﬁeldsarealwayspresent,butareunused
in some circumstances. In situations where the protocol does not use these ﬁelds, they
are essentially reserved bits. As such, they are exceptional opportunities for embedding
and should be modiﬁed by wardens.
Of the six types of ﬁelds that we have deﬁned, the application of Minimal Requisite
Fidelityismostcomplicatedforthetokencategory,forwhichwehavealreadydescribed
a solution. We have shown that, at least for the IP layer, MRF can be precisely deﬁned
and applied to each header ﬁeld. Thus an active warden can give a level of assurance
that IP headers are not being used for subliminal channels. In addition, this description
of semantics sheds light on what kind of semantic detail is necessary to describe a
structured carrier.
6.1 MRF Validation
The previous examination of IP was based on the protocol speciﬁcation. However, the
speciﬁcation is not necessarily indicative of real use. For example, a protocol imple-
mentation may make use of reserved bits that have not been standardized. To validate
our examination and determine which ﬁelds can be safely modiﬁed, we therefore per-
formed several feasibility studies by analyzing network trafﬁc from several sites. WeProtocol Field % Usage Number Packets
IP options present 0.0006091% 38358
IP ToS reserved bits set 12.2% 768423616
IP ToS precedence bit set 0.5254% 33090880
IP ToS delay bit set 11.76% 33090880
IP Don’t fragment 0.03692% 2324986
TCP no options 56.21% 3441988705
TCP reserved bits set 0.007008% 429164
TCP urgent bit set 0.0002275% 13934
TCP urgent ptr set 0.02417% 1479773
TCP MaxSeg option 3.395% 207894081
TCP Window option 0.6625% 40570864
TCP Bubba option 1.666e-06% 102
TCP Skeeter option 1.911e-06% 117
UDP all zero checksum 24.2% 32235386
Fig.2. Partial ﬁeld usage statistics from a month-long trace (over six billion packets).
present this information as a case study, and are not trying to make any observations
about trafﬁc composition as a whole on the Internet. The purpose of this study was to
determine which ﬁelds in IP, TCP, UDP, and ICMP can be safely modiﬁed by our war-
dens without breaking any applications. Our ﬁnal rule sets for IP, TCP, UDP, and ICMP
will be dependent on our observations from these studies.
In Figure 2, we list part of the results that we observed during our analysis. In
some instances, the results were surprising and showed several discrepancies. Why, for
example, is TCP’s urgent bit set in 13934 packets, but the urgent pointer is non-zero in
1479773 packets? Why were TCP’s reserved bits set in 429164 packets? Who could be
usingthe BubbaandSkeeter options2? While it is possible that these inconsistenciesare
duetofaultyimplementationsofTCP ornetworkerrors,we mustruleoutthepossibility
that legitimate communication channels are using these ﬁelds for justiﬁable purposes
before we modify these bits with an active warden.
In addition to determining legitimate uses of each ﬁeld, we must also ensure that
the correctness of the IP and TCP protocols and associated applications don’t change.
For example, changing the TTL without a proxy would break traceroute. Clearing the
TCP reserved bits could interfere with Explicit Congestion Notiﬁcation. For each rule
that we deﬁne for each bit in the packet header, we will need to verify that a legitimate
service will not be broken.
2 Communications on the Internet History mailing list from Frank Kastenholz explained the
original assignment of TCP options 16 and 17 to Stev Knowles of ftp Software, Inc. for Difﬁe-
Hellman Key Exchange.7 Proof-of-Concept Implementation
To demonstrate the techniques that we introduced in this paper, we have developed a
proof-of-concept implementation of software that hides data in several TCP/IP ﬁelds
and a warden that prevents those ﬁelds from being exploited. We implemented this
warden as a module in the System for Modular Analysis and Continuous Queries [7],
an extensible system for analyzing streaming data. To test the warden, we modiﬁed the
Covert TCP application [30] to embed data using each of the following methods. To
date, we enforce the following rules in IP and TCP:
1. If the TCP Reset ﬂag is set, there should be no TCP payload. Recalculate the the IP
packet length to make sure that the only payload is the TCP header.
2. The IP identiﬁcation ﬁeld can be used as a covert channel (as demonstrated by
Covert TCP). Assign a new IP ID to packets.
3. The TCP Initial Sequence Number (ISN) can be used as a covert channel (as
demonstrated by Covert TCP). Assign a new ISN at the beginning of a connec-
tion. Correct subsequent packets accordingly.
4. Reserved bits in TCP can be used as a covert channel. Zero these out.
5. If URG = 0, the urgent pointer is ignored and can be used to send covert data. Zero
out the urgent pointer in this instance.
6. Bounds checking on the urgent pointer. The pointer is an offset of data in the pay-
load. If the pointer is larger than the payload size, it is illegal and should be reset to
0 and the urgent ﬂag removed.
Thoughthis implementationonly exercises a few rules, our experimentalresults are
encouraging, showing minimal delay of the network trafﬁc and the complete elimina-
tion of embedded data in these ﬁelds. A complete warden implementation for IP, TCP,
UDP, and ICMP is in progress, and our preliminary results are very promising.
7.1 Implementation Issues
A key performance limitation with any sort of automated active warden or ﬁrewall is
the amount of state that must be saved for each packet or connection. The algorithms
described in Figure 1 can be efﬁciently implemented since they require minimal state.
To translate IP IDs, the warden can encrypt the original ID using some key.Because
themappingmustbestable acrossmultiplepacketsduringaconnection,we assumethat
a distinct pseudo-random key is used for each connection. Thus, the warden need only
store onekey foreachconnection.If the speedof the cipheritself is an issue, we assume
that a cryptographic co-processor can be used.
As described earlier, the semantics of sequence numbers require that the warden
only encrypt the initial sequence number and save the offset between the original and
new values. As described above,the handling of subsequentpackets requires only basic
mathematical operations. It is worth noting that this sort of mapping of sequence num-
bers is already supported by many Layer 7 switches that splice together separate TCP
connections to the client and server.8 Concluding Remarks
Inthispaper,wepresentedanddiscussedtheparadigmofproactivelypreventingsteganog-
raphy, covert channels, and other forms of network attack. This paradigm uses a notion
of Minimal Requisite Fidelity (MRF) to deﬁne the level of signal perturbation that is
both acceptable to users and destructive to steganography.To develop the idea of MRF,
we introducedthe concepts of unstructured and structured carriers and gave several ex-
amplesofhowanattackercanexploittheuse ofanythingmorethantheminimalﬁdelity
that is required for overt communications. For structured carriers, we were able to take
the analysis a step further and examine the feasibility of an active warden that rewrites
all network packets to removethe opportunityfor covert channels and steganographyat
the IP layer.
These initial explorations show a paradigm and a model with great promise. How-
ever, much work remains to deﬁne Minimal Requisite Fidelities for other carriers, and
to integrate this model in with traditional layered security models. Wardens won’t stop
every form of attack, but if part of a more comprehensive security model for a site can
greatly reduce the bandwidth of these attacks.
In addition to the techniques that we presented, there are additional dimensions of
ﬁdelity, such as timing, that must also be examined.As we have demonstrated,deﬁning
an objective Minimal Requisite Fidelity for unstructured carriers is a difﬁcult problem,
but one not without hope. For structured carriers such as network protocols, we believe
thatmuchmoreprecisedeﬁnitionsofﬁdelitycanbemadeandenforcedthroughdetailed
analysis of protocol semantics.
Excitingly, we have found that this paradigm transcends speciﬁc categories such
as steganography, network intrusions, and covert channels. The development of this
paradigm has been a stimulating synthesis of experience in each of these areas, and,
as such, we believe that the deployment of active wardens is a necessary addition to
site security perimeters. Technologies such as active wardens are a new opportunity
to create bi-directional security perimeters that protect against the malicious insider as
well as the outside attacker.
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